-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Laura Duhan Kaplan In the world of Jewish religious thought, Judaism is viewed as a language that is constituted by both its past and its present. Rabbis and scholars have a long history of addressing moral and ethical questions by interpreting the Hebrew Scriptures and the commentary built upon them. Because Jewish ethics are based upon scripture, new ethical questions must be addressed using the very words of the Hebrew Bible. Anything worth saying can be said in these words; after all, these words came directly out of the divine mouth, shaped the history of the Jewish people, gave form to the universe and the universe of discourse. Etymological associations, metaphorical expansions, and numerological conversions are all acceptable ways of developing and extending the meanings of the original words. It is no surprise, then, that the Jewish conversation on conscientious objection takes place in the language of the Hebrew Bible, bolstered by the linguistic interpretations of the rabbinic sages of late antiquity, recorded in the Mishnah and Talmud. Because of the role that religious, or halachic, law plays in Israeli society, these discussions are not just theological, but have an immediate political significance, especially when one considers the debate about the morality of performing one's military service in the Occupied Territories. In particular, the Israeli group of soldiers who call themselves Omets Lesarev ("Courage to Refuse"), referring to military duty in the Occupied Palestinian territories-base their argument for refusal to serve on religious law. The building blocks of the discussion on conscientious objection are found in Deuteronomy 20, which presents rules for the ethical conduct of war, including draft exemptions, peace negotiations, treatment of noncombatants, and environmental preservation. The narrative that frames the Book of Deuteronomy recounts Moses the Lawgiver instructing the assembled Israelites on the laws of warfare shortly before their invading army enters the land of Canaan, an invasion dated approximately 1200 bce by archeologists. Some critical Biblical scholars date Deuteronomy to the seventh century bce during the reign of King Josiah of Judah. They read II Kings 22-23 as suggesting that King Josiah hired a scribe to describe his program of religious reform as if it were the original law of Moses, and then staged an important archeological "discovery" of a pseudo-ancient scroll. Whether we read Deuteronomy as Moses' words or as Josiah's, it is likely that these laws are not meant to be theoretical or metaphorical, but are to govern the actual conduct of national military campaigns. Deuteronomy 20:5-8 focuses on exemptions from military service. Discussions by traditionally oriented Jewish scholars attempt first to determine which principles guide the exemptions and then when the exemptions apply. Who Can Be Released from Military Service? Deuteronomy 20:5-8 states: 5. And the officers shall speak to the people, saying, What man is there who has built a new house, and has not dedicated it? Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man dedicates it. 6. And what man is he who has planted a vineyard, and has not yet eaten of it? Let him also go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man eats of it. 7. And what man is there who has betrothed a wife, and has not taken her? Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man takes her. 8. And the officers shall speak further to the people, and they shall say, What man is there who is fearful and fainthearted? Let him go and return to his house, lest his brothers' heart faint as well as his heart. At first glance, the first three items on the list seem to form one category of exemption, and the last seems to stand alone. The first three deal with unresolved legal contracts or, in the most cynical sense, the acquisition of property, while the fourth seems to identify a psychological quality. However, as Rabbi Judith Z. Abrams has pointed out informally, all four items represent the recognition that a good soldier makes a wholehearted emotional commitment to warfare. Anyone whose attention is on life back home is not ready to commit to the discipline of warfare. Anyone who cannot harden his heart toward his peacetime life, should return home to his peacetime family and not put the unit in danger by being its weak link. An interesting pun in verse 8 supports Abrams' interpretation that all four exemptions are for those unable or unwilling to commit wholeheartedly to the war. The text says, "Let him go and return to his house, lest his brothers' heart faint as well as his heart." In Hebrew, the word translated as "faint" in "lest his brothers' heart faint" is mas. mas can be linked to two different word roots: masah means "melt" or "dissolve," but mas also refers to a "body of forced laborers." Thus, Deut. 20:8 can be translated as, "Let him go and return to his home, lest he melt his brothers' heart like his own" or as "Let him go.home, lest he make his brothers feel like forced laborers, as he feels." Read the second way, this verse suggests that one who feels forced to participate against his will should return home, lest his presence cause the entire troop to lose any sense of ownership over the campaign. The fourth exemption thus appears to be a summary of the principle behind the first three. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- One cannot argue with the facts of a text one believes to be divinely inspired. Yet it is possible that there could be future wars construed as obligatory wars, from which Israel could not afford to exempt anyone. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Mishnah and Tosefta, compilations of rabbinic views on Jewish ethics and practice from late antiquity (approximately 200 ce) seem, on the other hand, to view the fourth exemption as a new category. Why, the rabbis wonder, does the text of Deuteronomy introduce the fourth exemption with the words, "And the officers shall speak further to the people" unless it is an additional exemption? The Mishnah suggests that the fourth exemption is not about the ability to give full attention to battle. Instead, it is about fear. Mishnah Sotah (8:5) quotes Rabbi Akiva as saying, "Fearful and fainthearted is to be understood literally, viz., he is unable to stand in the battle-ranks and see a drawn sword." Perhaps the fearful soldier, out of consideration for his fellows, should return home. Perhaps returning home is more honorable than staying. For the fearful soldier might "melt the heart" of his fellows, and they might spend all of their time caring for him! The same Mishnah quotes Rabbi Jose the Galilean as describing another kind of fear when he says, "'Fearful and fainthearted' alludes to one who is afraid because of the transgressions he had committed." Here it seems the soldier worries that the divine punishments due him personally-death perhaps-might cause the army to fail. The issue of sin can also be restated in more contemporary terms for those who are cynical about divine justice. Perhaps a soldier guilty of moral transgressions lacks integrity and could influence others to behave without integrity. According to this Mishnah, the fearful soldier is not the same as the distracted soldier, who is required to complete important civilian business before he can commit to military service. The fearful soldier, on the other hand, can be fully present, but his participation weakens the group. According to both Judith Abrams' interpretation and that of the Mishnah, the exemptions are not granted for the sake of individuals, but rather serve the national interest. Thus soldiers who fall into any of categories in Deuteronomy 20:5-8 should simply not perform their military service. Tosefta puts Deuteronomy's discussion in a new context. Military preparedness becomes a metaphor for undertaking spiritual study. Here Rabbi Akiva is quoted as saying, "Even the most heroic of heroes, the strongest of the strong, if he was merciful, he would return [home], as it is written, 'lest his brothers' heart faint as well as his heart.'"(Tosefta Sotah 7:22). Rabbi Akiva's statement is a straightforward play on Hebrew word roots. Deuteronomy 20:8 speaks of the man who is "fainthearted." The Hebrew word that is translated as "faint" is rach, which is also heard in the word rachaman (compassionate). Thus Akiva interprets Deuteronomy 20:8 as ordering the compassionate soldier, regardless of his military prowess, to return home. In the Tosefta's context, the "bravest of the brave" might refer to the expert religious scholar. The expert might not want to melt the hearts of his fellows, or in other words, shame them, and ultimately himself, with his expertise. Thus, he should "return," or, in other words, reign himself in. If Rabbi Akiva's statement were part of the Mishnaic conversation about the fearful soldier-which its inclusion in the Tosefta's discussion of spiritual study does not preclude-then Rabbi Akiva could be understood to be arguing literally for the exemption of compassionate soldiers. Rabbi Arthur Waskow, director of The Shalom Center, presents Rabbi Akiva's statement in exactly this way in an article on the Center's website. Waskow understands the compassionate soldier to be the one who has compassion for the victims of war. This soldier must return home, lest he inspire compassion in his fellow soldiers. If they all refuse to harm the enemy, warfare cannot take place. A range of options for the fourth exemption now exists and includes the soldier who: a.. is preoccupied with unfulfilled family obligations b.. fears combat situations c.. has committed sins that may bring collective punishment upon the entire unit d.. possesses a moral character that threatens the integrity of the unit e.. has compassion for the victims of war and is thus unwilling to cause harm. The most inclusive conclusion is to suggest that each of these people would be poor soldiers and thus should be discharged from the military. Obligatory and Voluntary Wars When are all citizens eligible for military service morally obligated to fight? When is a leader morally obligated to allow exemptions for commitment, constitution, moral character, and pacifism? Should Deuteronomy 20 be understood strictly in its narrative setting, with the exemptions referring only to the original expedition into Canaan? Or should it be understood as King Josiah's creation, setting forth ongoing policies for a nation engaging regularly in military campaigns? If Deuteronomy 20 represents a national policy, does it apply equally to all wars, regardless of their purpose and scope? The Mishnah itself takes up these questions (in m. Sotah 8:7), experimenting with several possible answers. First it offers an anonymous opinion. To what does all the foregoing apply? To voluntary wars, but in the wars commanded by the Torah all go forth, even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy. According to this interpretation, it seems, the exemptions found in Deuteronomy 20:5-8 do not refer to the conquest of Canaan. The conquest of Canaan is described unequivocally in Deuteronomy as a war commanded by God through the instruction (Torah) of Moses. Surely if the exemptions in Deuteronomy refer to any specific wars at all, they refer to the wars for which the characters of Deuteronomy are mobilizing. Yet Deuteronomy 20:7 specifically exempts the bridegroom, while the anonymous Mishanic commentator specifically names bride and bridegroom as obligated participants. While this anonymous commentator lived more than a millennium before scholars began to question the origins of the Bible, he or she seems to think the exemptions apply to later wars, such as those a king like Josiah might have fought. The same Mishnah next quotes a different opinion, attributed to Rabbi Judah. R. Judah says: To what does all the foregoing apply? To the wars commanded by the Torah; but in obligatory wars all go forth, even a bridegroom from his chamber and a bride from her canopy. In contrast with the anonymous commentator, Rabbi Judah takes the narrative context of Deuteronomy seriously. If the exemptions apply to any wars, they must surely apply to wars in the context of which they were proclaimed. Important as the conquest of Canaan may have been to God, and to the development of the Israelite nation, God allowed exemptions from service. One cannot argue with the facts of a text one believes to be divinely inspired. Yet it is possible that there could be future wars construed as obligatory wars, from which Israel could not afford to exempt anyone. Given that the final opinion on a subject in a traditional Jewish text is usually construed as the authoritative one, and given that Rabbi Judah is credited with the authorship of the Mishnah, the Mishnah seems to favor Rabbi Judah's opinion. Thus, according to the Mishnah, Deuteronomy is to be respected at face value; however, the conquest of Canaan is not to be taken as paradigmatic of all wars. Some future wars might be construed as obligatory, with no exemptions allowed. The Talmud, an early medieval compilation of rabbinic thought, organized as a series of comments on the Mishnah, recognizes that the Mishnah's discussion here leaves several loose logical threads that need to be woven together. The Talmud (in a discussion in b. Sotah 44b) seems to perceive that between them the anonymous commentator and Rabbi Judah have created three categories of wars: wars commanded by the Torah, obligatory wars, and voluntary wars. This set of categories seems odd, for surely wars commanded by the Torah should be the very paradigm of obligatory wars. To solve the problem, the Talmud concludes that there really are only two categories of war: obligatory and voluntary. When the anonymous voice speaks of "wars commanded by the Torah," it refers to obligatory wars, and not only to wars explicitly described in the Torah. It uses the language "commanded by Torah" to indicate that the moral imperative to go to war can be as important as any other religious, ethical, or social commandment and, in fact, outweighs the commandment of dedicating a home, harvesting first fruits, or consummating a marriage. Thus, even according to the anonymous voice, there are only two categories of wars, voluntary and obligatory. In voluntary wars, the Deuteronomic exemptions apply. In obligatory wars, no exemptions apply. What, then, distinguishes obligatory wars from voluntary wars? The Talmud states: The wars waged by Joshua to conquer [Canaan] were obligatory in the opinion of all; the wars waged by the House of David for territorial expansion were voluntary in the opinion of all; where they differ is with regard to [wars] against heathens so that these should not march against them. Elsewhere (m. Sanhedrin 2:4) the Mishnah adds: He [the King] may lead forth [the host] to a voluntary war on the decision of a court of seventy-one. In other words, an obligatory war is ordained by God in the Torah, and can be called by a king or general without the authority of a general assembly. A voluntary war allows for a country's expansion or increased power and wealth, and must be supported by the judicial body. Wars that are not clearly either obligatory or voluntary might include wars in response to threats to national security, such as another nation amassing troops at the border, developing weapons of mass destruction, cutting off access to trade, taking citizens hostage, or attacking an ally. Contemporary Relevance These, then, are the basic terms in which Jewish discussion of conscientious objection takes place. Most recently, the Omets Lesarev refusniks have cast their arguments in exactly these terms. Following Rabbi Akiva in the Tosefta, they establish their credibility as the most heroic of heroes, and, following Rabbi Judith Z. Abrams, as soldiers who have never placed their families before their military service, thus establishing themselves as committed soldiers. However, because they are compassionate, a moral feature emphasized by Rabbi Arthur Waskow, they choose to return home. This occupation, they say, is corrupting the hearts of their fellows, and they do not wish to further the corruption, as Deuteronomy 20 adjures them not to. Their refusal to fight is justified, since the occupation is a voluntary war, as defined in Talmud, waged for territorial expansion. Because it does not fit the category of wars commanded by Torah, as understood by the Mishnah's anonymous commentator, they are not exempt from the commandment not to oppress the stranger. In the words of their declaration: We, reserve combat officers and soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces.have always served in the front lines.in spite of the dear cost to our personal lives. [We], have been on.duty all over the Occupied Territories, and were issued commands and directives that had nothing to do with the security of our country. We.sensed how the commands issued to us in the Territories, destroy all the values we had absorbed while growing up in this country. We.understand now that the price of Occupation is the loss of.human character and the corruption of the entire Israeli society. We shall not continue to fight beyond the 1967 borders in order to dominate, expel, starve and humiliate an entire people. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Laura Duhan Kaplan is professor and chair of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, a senior student in the Aleph Rabbinic Program, and a member of Concerned Philosophers for Peace. http://www.tikkun.org/magazine/index.cfm/action/tikkun/issue/tik0411/article/041112a.html
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