HOW TO SAY SOMETHING AND MEAN NOTHING: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON PREACHING

(From a pastor-friend):

First a disclaimer of sorts...

The following are my notes on Matthew Jacoby's presentation on Speech Act theory and its implications for preaching (given at the Baptist Union "Rev Up", 9th November, 2005, Whitley College, Parkville). The reader should keep two things in mind; First, there are places in the following where I have thrown in my response to Matthew's presentation without any effort at discriminating my views from his. Second, given my own lack of familiarity with Speech Act theory, it is more than likely that I have misunderstood Matthew's position. In consequence, while I would praise very highly the quality of Matthew's presentation, I would also warn that it isn't necessarily reflected in the following. For the good stuff, thank Matthew. For the dubious accretions, blame me! - Murray Hogg.

To start with the obvious...

PREACHING INVOLVES SPEAKING

Speaking involves 3 acts;

1) LUCUTION - is the basic act of saying something, issuing sounds, forming words and sentences. When one speaks one is engaging in a "locutionary act."

2) ILLOCUTION - which is what one is actually doing when one speaks, whether this be informing, warning, promising, commanding, etc.

3) PERLOCUTION - is the achievement of something through the use of speech act.

So, for example, take a situation in which a speaker S wishes to dissuade a hearer H from swimming in a crocodile infested river.

First, S - if he wishes to say anything to H at all - will need to perform the locutionary act by actually say "There are crocodiles in the water."

Second, we see that this act of locution intended as a warning and so we say that in performing the locutionary act of uttering "there are crocodiles in the water" S is also performing the illocutionary act of warning.

Third, we recognize that S is not simply interested in warning H, but in having H take some action. In this case, not swimming in the river. If S is successful in dissuading H from swimming in the river, then we can say that S has performed a further act; the perlocutionary act of dissuading.

We can see here a "hierarchy" of sorts in operation here;

Locution Illocution Perlocution

Saying something What is being done in the act of saying something (e.g. warning) What is achieved by saying something (e.g. dissuading)

WHAT, THEN, DOES IT MEAN TO SAY "I UNDERSTAND"?

If I yell to a swimmer "there are crocodiles in the water" then it is my intention to warn them of a present danger. If the swimmer does not understand my communication as a warning, then it follows that they have not grasped the meaning of my words.

Thus, although I have engaged in a locutionary act (yelling "there are crocodiles in the water") I have not actually committed an illocutionary act of warning.

In this, we say that my words have lacked "illocutionary force" - they have failed to achieve the illocutionary purpose which my locutionary act intended.

In such an instance it would be proper to say that the swimmer has not truly understood what I mean to say.

Thus for any person to say "I understand" in response to a locutionary act, they must apprehend the illocutionary force of the statement.

CONDITIONS FOR ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS

For a locutionary act to have illocutionary force, certain conditions must apply.

INSTRUCTING - it is evident to both S and H that S has a legitimate claim on the information he is communicating (i.e. both S and H consider that S knows what he is talking about).

WARNING - both S and H have reason to believe that a certain event may occur that is not in the best interests of H (i.e. the warning is not seen as pointing toward an empty threat)

PROMISING - it is evident to both S and H that S has an authoritative connection with possible outcomes (i.e. S is able to deliver on his promise).

COMMANDING - it can be perceived by H that S has a legitimate claim to a position of authority over H (i.e. H understands that S has a right to issue orders).

We can say that unless the requisite conditions apply, one is able to perform a locutionary act but cannot perform an illocutionary act.

That is to say, one can speak but one's words will fail to convey the intended meaning (lack illocutionary force).

Now, note the very important point;

NOWHERE in all of this is there any suggestion that the speaker has said anything which is contrary to fact.

THUS the question of whether the content of a locutionary act is according to fact is not at issue.

What IS at issue is whether the locutionary act actually achieves it purpose; whether it carries illocutionary effect.

For example;

If I say "there are crocodiles in the water" and it is the case that there are crocodiles in the water but the hearer has no idea what a "crocodile" is, then it is clear that I have not communicated my meaning.

And thus I can ask...

Even if I have uttered a factually accurate locution, have I spoken the truth?

WHAT IS TRUTH?

Some scriptural passages and reflections;

Your Word is truth. (John 17:17)

All Scripture is God-breathed (2 Timothy 3:16)

From passages like the above, a "propositional" view of scripture is often advanced. In such a view, the most important consideration is the factual accuracy of the statements of Scripture.

But - we ought not to assume that all locutionary acts are intended to inform. For example;

O God, why have You cast us off forever? Why does Your anger smoke against the sheep of Your pasture? (Psalm 74:1)

Obviously, even a Biblical literalist will point out that these are questions, not propositions. But there is a clearly implied propositional statement lurking in the background which can be brought out with a little gentle rephrasing. So, imagine the Psalmist saying something like;

Lord, You have cast us off forever. Why is that?

And the basic presupposition of that question is, of course, a difficult (impossible?) one if we take propositional truth as the primary characteristic of Scripture.

From what has been said above, however, there is no difficulty in seeing this locutionary act of this verse as intending the illocutionary act of reminding. In other words, what the Psalmist says is "O God, why have You cast us off forever?" but what the Psalmist is doing is reminding God of his covenant promise to Israel (of course, God probably hasn't forgotten it, but that's another story!)

What matters here is the simple fact that the meaning of Psalm 74:1 is found not in a grammatical or textual or semantic analysis of the locutionary act but in understanding the intention of this act - i.e. the meaning is found in the illocutionary act of the Psalmist.

"The truth" here is NOT that God has forsaken his people, but that the Psalmist wishes to hold God to the terms of the covenant which He made with Israel. It's not, in short, what the Psalmist says (although that is certainly relevant) but what he is doing in saying it that brings meaning to the text.

And this leads us to a key question about speech acts and scripture...

Can we EVER disassociate what is being SAID in Scripture from what is being DONE in scripture and STILL have "the truth"?

The obvious answer, if we take seriously what has been said so far, is "no"!

We cannot disassociate divine locution from illocution and still have "the truth" in the richest sense of the word.

Note at this point that in our discussions afterward, we wondered if speaking of "truth" might not embroil us in problems here. The historical usage of the term "truth" has often revolved around notions of correspondence of statements to facts (or states of affairs) so it may not be a good term to use when speaking of acts - one can, after all, understand what it means to say an act has meaning. But what does it mean to say an act is "true"? Here we have to understand that the "truth" of a speech act is located precisely in the meaning of the act, not in the "truth" of the language (but notice the equivocation of the term "truth" even here!) Thus it is probably less helpful to say that a speech act is true than it is to say that we have apprehended its meaning. And I think even very literalist approaches to language can probably get the gist of this reasoning.

A further note: at this point in Matthew's discussion I was wondering where perlocution fits in all of this. If a speech act is "more true" when it's illocution is taken into account, does it only become "fully true" when perlocution is considered? Going back to the Psalm 74:1 instance, could we say that the passage is only "fully true" if it actually results in divine response? Dunno - merits some reflection...

HOW TO SPEAK THE TRUTH (or getting to the point of how this connects with preaching)

We need always to ask what is being done not just what is being said.

We need thus to ask whether we have fulfilled the conditions for illocutionary acts.

For instance, the condition for the illocutionary act of instruction is that (from above);

it is evident to both S and H that S has a legitimate claim on the information he is communicating.

SO, in the instance of preaching, we must ask whether the preacher has "a legitimate claim on the information he is communicating."

AND here things get tricky because...

NO HUMAN is EVER in a position to have a legitimate claim on information about God.

Here it is tempting to jump the gun and introduce the notion of divine revelation or similar.

But this would be to miss the strength of the objection

Fact is that no human views things from the divine perspective. No person can speak for God - thus no person can legitimately instruct others with regard to the divine perspective. No person knows infallibly the outcome of any course of action - thus no person can legitimately warn others about consequences of actions. No person can control those same courses of events - thus no person can legitimately promise others about outcomes. Finally, no person has ultimate authority over another - thus no person can legitimately command another without reservation.

SO we can reiterate;

NO HUMAN is EVER in a position to inform, warn, promise, command, or perform any other illocutionary act on God's behalf.

That is to say...

There is a sense in which we can never perform an illocutionary act when God is the content of our predication.

But let's make things even more difficult!

Jumping back to the conditions under which the illocutionary act of informing is possible, notice that the legitimacy of the speaker's claim to instruct must be evident to the hearer. BUT how can my claim to instruct (or warn, promise, command, etc) on God's behalf ever be evident to another person? Simply put, it cannot.

SO in the act of preaching, NEITHER the preacher NOR the congregation can acknowledge that the preacher has a legitimate claim to instruct, warn, promise, command, etc on God's behalf.

Thus, although the preacher can talk about God, he cannot instruct, warn, promise, command, etc, with divine authority.

In other words, the preacher can perform a locutionary act but not an illocutionary act in which God is the substantial content.

So we ask...

WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE PREACHING?

Well, despite the above, preaching can still have force under one special circumstance;

Preaching can have illocutionary force in those instances where God (not the preacher!) is performing a perlocutionary act of which human speech is a part.

Consider;

I will put My Spirit within you and cause you to walk in My statutes, and you shall keep My judgments and do them . (Ezekiel 36:27)

Here note that God's promise is something more than simply informing, or warning, or advising. The specific promise is "I will CAUSE you to walk..." where the word "cause" is the Hebrew: `âsâh - to make or to do. This is NOT therefore a translational glitch. The Hebrew very specifically sees this promise as pertaining specifically to something that God will do within the life of the recipient of the promise.

Here we can contrast a common understanding of preaching as discourse intended to invoke response. But this is categorically NOT the fundamental aim of preaching. Indeed, to work with such an understanding is to risk reducing preaching to mere mechanism in which "sound preaching" invokes "appropriate response".

Classically, this idea is seen in the belief that if one preaches good biblical doctrine then it will invoke a properly spiritual response. At a more questionable level, it reduces to little more than manipulation - one "preaches for effect" whether that effect be coming forward for an altar call or putting one's hand in one's wallet.

So, categorically, preaching is NOT intended to "invoke response".

RATHER, preaching should be seen as part of the perlocutionary act of God in which...

it is God who works in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure (Phil 2:13)

Consider the following;

(18) For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. (19) For it is written: "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, And bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent." (1 Corinthians 1:18.19)

In human perspective the preaching of the Gospel is foolishness. As such it isn't going to "invoke" anything but ridicule!

BUT when it takes place in the power of God, when it is part of the perlocutionary act of God, it has saving power, it is transformative.

[I wonder if we can say that there is no distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts of God? MJ's suggestion was that to speak of God engaging in locutionary acts is an anthropomorphism and that God, properly, only engages in perlocutionary acts - at least, this is how I understood him]

So, moving on, we find...

(1) And I, brethren, when I came to you, did not come with excellence of speech or of wisdom declaring to you the testimony of God. (2) For I determined not to know anything among you except Jesus Christ and Him crucified. (3) I was with you in weakness, in fear, and in much trembling. (4) And my speech and my preaching were not with persuasive words of human wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, (5) that your faith should not be in the wisdom of men but in the power of God. (1 Corinthians 2:1-5)

Now, obvious is the same contrast of human effort and divine power. As in the earlier passage it is clear that Paul's preaching wasn't effectual because of its rhetorical eloquence or philosophical profundity. It's effect was not because of "the wisdom of men" but because of "the power of God".

But notice one more thing - Paul speaks about "the testimony of God" (1). His message was a result of the perlocutionary act of God in Paul's own life! Paul wasn't just preaching the message - he WAS the message! And so he doesn't speak of declaring "my convictions about God" or "my theological position" - rather it is a very personal testimony of God (think in terms of Kierkegaard's notion of "truth as subjectivity" - to speak of the "truth" of the Gospel is only meaningful when it impacts me subjectively - God doesn't want us to agree with a proposition, he wants us to encounter the divine life).

Because Paul has personally encountered God he speaks in terms of being a witness (Greek: marturia) - one who testifies to what one has experienced personally.

From this...

WE are not witnesses if we do not speak as part of God's perlocutionary act!

Hence the promise (which sort of goes full circle to the Ezekiel passage cited above!);

you shall receive power, the Holy Spirit coming upon you. And you shall be witnesses to Me both in Jerusalem and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and to the end of the earth. (Acts 1:8).

Our preaching is EITHER in the power of God OR it is MEANINGLESS!

---------- BIBLIOGRAPHY

The philosophical basis of the above is found in the area of Philosophy of Language known as Speech Act Theory. For more on this see;

John L. Austin, _How To Do Things With Words_, Harvard University Press; 2nd edition (September, 1975)

John Searle, _Speech Acts_, Cambridge University Press; New Ed edition (January 2, 1969)